Beyond Religion and Enlightenment

CHARLES LARMORE*

We need an understandingof morality that is equal to our unprecedented intellectual situation - a situation that is beyond religion and Enlightenment. This understanding can be found in
combining a conception of reason which is at home in historical
contingency with the acknowledgement that our form of life involves a commitment to a universal ethic of categorical duties.
I.

God is so great, he does not have to exist. This is the essence of
the process of secularization that has so profoundly shaped modern
society. The repudiation of idols, the respect for God's transcendence, is what has led to relieving God from the task of being the
ultimate explanation for the order of nature and the course of history. To explain something in terms of divine action or Providence
always amounts to placing God among the finite causes we have already found or can imagine discovering. Once we have resolved to let
God be God, we can no longer use God for our own cognitive ends.
A similar unburdening of God seems appropriate in the domain of
morality. When the validity of a moral imperative is understood in
terms of being God's command, the motive of the moral life becomes
the desire to please God, as though we could help him or should fear
him. Such a conception of God must appear as an all-too-human
projection, if we assume that God must transcend such human needs
and passions. We respect God as God, when we learn to value the
moral life for itself, without appeal to God's purposes (though we
*
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may still believe that God loves what is good and right).
This view of the modern process of secularization has two important consequences. The first is that the process is rooted in JudeoChristian monotheism itself. The God of the Bible is a jealous God:
at the head of the Decalogue stands the prohibition of idols. It was
thus God's fate, slowly worked out through the centuries, to be freed
from the human tasks of this world, from our need to explain nature
and to found morality. Thus, secularization does not consist in the
illegitimate expropriation of the divine attributes and in their Promethean transference to man. On this point Hans Blumenberg, the
great advocate of the legitimacy of the modern age, is certainly
right. But Blumenberg is wrong to lay such emphasis on the idea
that secularization has freed us from an incoherent theology which
dealt in questions (such as how an omnipotent God could create a
world in which there is evil) that could not be answered.' The alternative view I wish to propose is that secularization is instead the
inner logic of Judeo-Christian monotheism.
I should observe that this view is not the same as Max Weber's
famous thesis that certain forms of monotheism (particularly the
Calvinist sects that tied the doctrine of justification by faith alone to
the need for works as proof of election) led to the "innerworldly asceticism" which created the modern world. It is rather a generalization of Weber's results: God's transcendence has led to his
withdrawal from the world and thus to the autonomy of the world,
even where (as in morality) the world has not become, as Weber
thought, the object of rational domination. In a recent work, Le
desenchantement du monde, Marcel Gauchet has developed this
view in a very persuasive way. He has shown that Christian monotheism has been "the religion for leaving religion behind," a way of
eliminating the sacred within the world ad majorem gloriam Dei.
"Plus les dieux sont grands," he writes, "plus les hommes sont2
libres" ("The more the gods are great, the more men are free.").
The same idea can be found in the famous letters Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote to Eberhard Bethge, in which Bonhoeffer sought to distinguish true faith from religion, which is an expression of human
weakness. 3
In putting forward this conception, I do not want to suggest that
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the Judeo-Christian tradition has tended uniformly toward secularization. Catholic thought, by stressing the need for mediation between the individual conscience and God (through the Church, the
sacraments, and the saints), has certainly been less favorable to this
tendency than Protestant or Jewish thought. In addition, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation can easily be seen as reintroducing
the sacred into the world - although it can also be understood as
the divine affirmation of the intrinsic value of the world, and in this
form it has been indeed an essential element in the process of secularization I have described. The "Judeo-Christian" tradition is obviously not all of a piece. What I wish to maintain is that God's
transcendence, if thought through consistently to the end, must lead
to secularization.
From this point of view, there is no deep opposition between monotheism and modernity. Or at least this is so, in so far as monotheism heeds God's transcendence, and as modernity requires the purely
naturalistic explanation of nature and a purely human understanding
of morality. Modernity has been a way of fulfilling Judeo-Christian
monotheism. By this I do not mean that the two are the same, that
every exponent of modernity is, at least implicitly, a believer in the
One God. The point is rather that not only are the two largely compatible, but also that monotheism paved the way for the successes of
modernity. Only thus can we explain why a society that had defined
itself by religious ideals for centuries could so quickly welcome the
autonomy of science and morality.
The second consequence of this theory of secularization is that the
autonomy of science and morality does not imply that faith must
disappear. Otherwise, the theory would scarcely be plausible, for
faith is far from dying out. What it asserts is instead that religion
can no longer fulfill certain functions that belonged to it before, in
pre-modern societies. We can no longer expect religion to provide
ultimate explanations of nature or ultimate justifications of morality.
It is in this that the so-called "death of God" consists. But this outcome does not exclude the possibility that we may still find in God
an answer to the question of the meaning of life. Indeed, it is possible to affirm with Jean-Luc Marion that "la <<mort de Dieu>> [est]
le visage moderne de son insistante et eternellefidelite" ("The death
of God is the modern visage of his persistent and eternal fidelity.")."
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Religious experience, prayer and commitment may still remain important, and perhaps only acquire their true significance, to the extent we do not fall prey to the illusion that knowledge and duty,
however essential they may be, embody all our aspirations.
So when at the beginning I described modern secularization as the
realization that "God is so great, he does not have to exist," I did
not mean that God does not exist or that his nonexistence is implied
by the outlook of modernity. I meant that he does not need to exist,
though it may well be true that he exists. We no longer need God to
explain the world and to ground the rules of our common life. Si
Dieu n'existait pas, il ne faudrait plus I'inventer ("If God did not
exist it would no longer be necessary to invent him."). This means a
liberation of man. It also means a liberation of God. If we follow
Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and identify "religion" with the
use of God for cosmological and moral purposes, distinguishing it
from faith, we can say that modern society is beyond religion.
II.
So much for what seems already settled. Now we come to the real
problems. Are the leading ideas of the Enlightenment, in which the
outlook of modernity has so often found expression, able to take over
the functions from which God has been discharged? Even if God
transcends these functions, it need not follow that Man, his heir, is
equal to such new responsibilities. In the domain of the sciences
there arises the following question: In what sense can we speak of
the truth of theories that we may well have good reasons to accept, if
we lack a divine guarantee that our reason (that is, our capacity to
recognize the validity of reasons) is adequate to the world? In the
domain of morality there is an analogous question: What authority
can moral imperatives claim to govern our conduct, once we have
given up the perspective in which moral imperatives are seen as the
commandments of a superior being? It seems that there can be no
law, and so no moral law, without a legislator. Who can function as
moral legislator after the withdrawal of God?
I shall leave aside the question about the truth of the sciences, in
part because it is not particularly urgent. At least it is not so for the
sciences, though it may be urgent for philosophy. Modern (natural)
science has learned how to proceed according to internal criteria,
which can in principle be satisfied on the basis of experimental evidence which must itself conform to scientific requirements. In this
way progress, the reasoned preference for one scientific claim or theory over others, becomes possible. The scientist can dispense with the
external, purely philosophical question about the relation between
this process of science and the world itself. He need not ask whether
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a theory that is supported and favored by good experimental evidence therefore corresponds to reality, whether it is "true."
The situation appears very different in the domain of morality. If
we believe we are subject to certain moral duties, from which we
cannot be excused just because we are not interested in complying
with them, we are thinking of them as constraints or laws. They are
"categorical," as Kant would say, yet in a sense that has nothing to
do with the peculiarities of Kantian ethics. Even "consequentialist"
(e.g., utilitarian) views of morality rely on a categorical "ought."
The obligation to do the action which brings about the most good
overall is held by consequentialists to be binding on us whatever our
other interests. The idea of categorical obligation is, for reasons I
shall examine later, characteristic of the modern understanding of
morality. (Not all of the ordinary morality we recognize can be understood as categorical, but certainly a significant part presents itself
in these terms.) 5 Now quite possibly we can be accustomed to seeing
ourselves as subject of these laws without having some notion of
their source, of a legislator. But this frame of mind is by its nature
unstable. The very idea of law impels us to look for its legislator. We
thus see ourselves forced, either to determine the source of moral
laws, or to call into question the very idea of a moral law. In this
regard, an understanding of the foundations of morality is therefore
not a purely philosophical matter. It belongs to the survival conditions of morality itself.
Now to what extent are the characteristic forms of Enlightenment
thought able to solve this problem? Despite the obvious danger in
defining a movement so complex as the Enlightenment, I believe we
may consider as one of its most important legacies the project of
locating the source of moral norms, no longer in God, but in the
nature of Man. Within this movement of thought there were, of
course, significant points of disagreement. One of them concerned
the way in which human nature was supposed to serve as the source
of morality. Do moral norms derive their very existence from human
nature, or do they consist in independent truths whose authority
human nature on its own, without appeal to God, is able to recognize? There was also the disagreement about which aspect of human
nature was supposed to be decisive - sentiment or reason. The sentimentalist alternative quickly revealed itself to be rather unpromising. Feelings of approval and disapproval are too variable, from
5. See
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person to person, from situation to situation, from culture to culture,
to serve as the basis of a universal morality, to ground a morality of
duties and rights valid for everyone. This is the conclusion to which
Diderot came in Le neveu de Rameau,6 after having given up his
first enthusiasm for the sentimentalist ethics he found in Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson. If feelings play a role in a universal morality, then it
is only to the extent that they are corrected and guided by reflection.
And this seems to lead to the second, rationalist alternative.
In the rationalist view, it is practical reason itself which serves as
the source for moral laws. As I have indicated, this view can take
two forms. One is that practical reason is thought able to construct
such laws, as in Kant's ethics. The other is that practical reason is
thought able on its own to recognize (some would say by "intuition")
the authority for our conduct of certain abstract principles, as in the
early 18th century ethics of Samuel Clarke. In one or the other of
these versions, the rationalist conception remains one of the most vital currents in contemporary ethics (on the "constructivist" side
there are R.M. Hare, D. Gauthier, and J. Habermas; on the "intuitionist" side, Th. Nagel).7 Their common conviction is that simply in
undertaking to be rational agents, we must accept certain norms of
conduct with regard to other agents, whatever may be the other beliefs we have.
Before going further, I should observe that this way of understanding morality is not exactly that of Kant himself. Though he
indeed believed that categorical duties represent the laws a rational
being would impose on himself, Kant did not think (at least beginning with the Critique of PracticalReason8 ) that this could serve as
an argument for showing that we are subject to categorical duties.
According to Kant, practical reason can be legislative only if it is
free, only if it transcends all empirically conditioned interests (since
it is upon these interests, after all, that it is to impose its authority).
But this means that it can never be an object of our knowledge, and
so can never be used to prove that we are under moral obligations. In
Kant's view, our only grounds for believing that reason is the source
of morality arise from our prior conviction (which he calls a "fact of
reason") that we are bound by categorical obligations., Further on, I
shall reject the idea that reason can be the source of morality what Kant himself proposed as an explanation of morality. But I
6. DENIS DIDEROT, LE NEVEU DE RAMEAU (Garnier-Flammarion 1967).
7. For an important discussion of the differences between these two versions see
John Rawls, Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy, in KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS: THE THREE Critiques and the Opus Postumum 95-102 (Eckart F6rster ed., 1989).
8. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis W. Beck trans., 3d
ed. 1993).
9. See Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good, 20 PHILOSOPHIA 15, 15-32
(1990).
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believe that the other part of his doctrine, the idea that there are
moral convictions it cannot be the task of moral philosophy to justify, but which must be accepted as the framework within which we
reason, is closer to the truth.
The project of grounding morality in practical reason is better exemplified by the contemporary philosophers I mentioned before, who
intend to do without a metaphysics of freedom. The general pattern
of their argument, common to both "constructivist" and "intuitionist" versions, is this: (1) To act rationally, one must act for what one
believes to be good reasons. One must then also believe (2) that all
other rational agents would agree that they are good reasons. So
even in the case of instrumental rationality, where one believes a
certain action is the reasonable way to satisfy some given interest,
one must also believe that all rational agents would agree that it is
reasonable, given that interest (which they may or may not share).
Now if the rationality of some action must be an object of agreement among all rational agents, it seems (3) impossible for it to depend essentially upon beliefs which some rational agents may have,
but others may not. It must instead (4) be ascertainable from a position of completely detached reflection, in which one stands back
from all one's present beliefs, except the commitment to reason itself, in order to appraise the merits of the action. Thus, (5) rational
action is such that all rational agents will see its rationality as having an unconditional claim on them, binding upon them whatever
their other beliefs. (Of course, not all rational agents need therefore
have good reason to perform the action, for its rationality, which
they must recognize, may consist in its best satisfying some given
interest, which they may not share.)
More needs to be said, certainly, about the nature of rationality, if
the unconditional claims of rational action are to become more specific and begin to resemble what we ordinarily understand by moral
obligations. Here differences emerge among the philosophers sharing
this line of argument. Whatever its particular form, however, this
argument seems to me unpersuasive. Its failure lies, not just in there
remaining, after all, an unbridgeable gap between (5) and what we
usually understand as morality, but also in the steps leading to (5)
itself.
My objection turns on the fact that rationality is as such an abstract capacity. Its rules are abstract ones, such as that contradictions are to be avoided or (perhaps) that one should pursue what one

believes to be good and avoid what one believes to be bad. 10 Such
rules are at best a necessary, not a sufficient means for determining
(in conjunction with nonmoral information about the world) the validity of any moral norms.
Perhaps the best general way to prove this point is to observe that
rationality is not anything like a Platonic essence, its contours fixed
independently of what we might choose them to be. I do not mean
that we should think a norm is valid or rational just because we have
decided that it is so. That would certainly be wrong. But the rationality of a norm differs from the idea of a norm of rationality. Of the
norms of thought and action we hold to be valid it is we who decide
which (naturally not all!) will also count as norms of rationality. We
should do so, however, with an eye to two things we want from a
concept of rationality. First, norms of rationality should be highly
formal, indifferent to subject matter. And second, they should be as
indisputable as possible, readily acceptable to all no matter what else
they may believe; for norms about which there are or can be doubts
or disagreement are precisely those which we want to be able to
show that it is rationalto accept or reject. (A notion of rationality is
rather pointless if we can say about someone who does not share
some norm of ours only that he is not being "rational.") How unlikely must it then be that norms of thought and action selected precisely for their formal, indisputable character should be sufficient
(along with nonmoral information about the world) to derive anything so substantial as the universalist morality with which we are
familiar! In any case, what can be conclusively shown is how particular attempts at such a derivation fail: either the norms assigned to
the idea of rationality do not really suffice, or they do so only because they go beyond the indisputable and are already substantial
moral norms in disguise.
It may, for example, be an inherent feature of moral rationality
(that is, of whatever may count as rationality in the moral realm)
that our moral judgments should be, in Hare's sense, "universalizable": They should not be based on which persons in the given situation we happen to be. But contrary to Hare, such
"universalizability" is not by itself, or along with other indisputable
formal properties of "moral language" (plus information about people's preferences), able to justify any substantial moral norms.'
10. I add the qualification "perhaps" with regard to the second rule because some
philosophers, Thomists, for example, have understood it to imply directly the famous
doctrine of double effect. Without thinking that this doctrine must be invalid, I am sure
that it is far too controversial to be drawn simply from what may count as the nature of
practical rationality.
11. For an illuminating critique of Hare along these lines, see Thomas Nagel, The
Foundations of Impartiality, in HARE AND CRITIcs: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINK.ING 10112 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988).
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Kant's own criterion of universalization presents what in this context
must be a contrary defect. This criterion ("Act only according to
those maxims which you can at the same time will that they become
universal laws.") is more substantial than Hare's, and it can plausibly account for many (if not all) of the duties of ordinary morality.
But contrary to Kant, this criterion goes well beyond what can be
drawn from practical rationality as such. To see this, note that it
involves far more than the requirement to avoid contradictory maxims. It makes the demand that not just under certain conditions
(e.g., common moral resolve), but always we judge the morality of
our maxim of action, not according to what will ensue if we (perhaps
alone) act on the maxim, but according to what would ensue if everyone were to act on it. In other words, it forbids us to determine
what we ought morally to do by reference to how others are likely to
use our actions for their own, perhaps immoral purposes. This sort of
outlook (which Weber called an "ethics of conviction"' 2 ) is, whether
correct or not, too controversial to be drawn from the mere notion of
practical rationality.
Rationality as such constitutes, then, too slender a basis for justifying the validity of any moral obligation. In saying this, I do not
wish to deny that we can justify rationally the validity of certain
moral obligations. But we can do so only by relying upon the presumed validity of other moral obligations. Practical reason cannot
therefore be the source of morality. On the contrary, reason becomes
capable of moral argumentation only within an already existing morality. Instead of ascending to an absolutely detached point of view,
we should acknowledge, what is surely so: that we belong to a moral
tradition already in place. When we try to rise above our historical
situation, reason loses its substance and becomes mute. Contrary to
(2) in the argument above, conduct that is rational for one agent, in
a given situation, need not be so for another. Whether it is rational
depends generally on what else he happens to believe.
For these reasons I do not believe that the rationalist ethics stemming from the Enlightenment can succeed. Reason cannot take over
the function of grounding morality, now that God has been dispensed from the task.
One possible reaction to this result would be to conclude that the
legislative conception of morality makes sense only within a certain
theological perspective, and that we should therefore look for a new
OGY
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77-128 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).

SOCIOL-

moral conception in which the notions of law and legislator would
not play so central a role. 13 Following this line of thought, one could
easily come to believe that in fact such an ethic has been available
for some time. It is the ethics of Aristotle, according to which morality, far from consisting of categorical duties, is part of the self-realization to which all men are drawn by their nature. It is not by
accident if today a neo-Aristotelianism in ethics is so widespread, in
America as well as in Europe.1 4 Its different forms agree upon one
essential point: morality must be viewed as an attractive, not an imperative ideal, as an element of the flourishing life we naturally desire, and not as a set of norms imposed on our self-fulfillment from
without. The prevalence of this outlook testifies to the crisis of the
legislative conception of morality.
Neo-Aristotelianism appears to me, however, to labor under a
profound blindness concerning the modern situation. Since the 16th
century, modern thought has been increasingly characterized by the
awareness that rational agreement about the nature of the good life
is improbable. The more we talk about the meaning of life, the more
likely it is that we will disagree. This experience is one of the principal reasons why Aristotelian ethics lost so much of its prestige in the
first centuries of the modern era. Aristotle had assumed that the
meaning of life, the nature of self-realization, can be the object of
rational consensus, and so had sought to explain in these terms the
value of the virtues. By contrast, early-modern theories of natural
right, beginning with Grotius (the true father of modern ethics),
sought to circumscribe an elementary ethics, valid for all, as independent as possible of controversial views of human flourishing. Such
a morality was therefore naturally viewed as a set of categorical duties. 5 It is not, as I have observed, the whole of our moral self-understanding, but it has certainly become a central part of it. The
legislative view of morality draws directly on one of the distinctive
experiences of modernity.
In the end, neo-Aristotelianism founders on the same difficulty as
Enlightenment ethics: Man's essence does not provide any firm point,
13. This was already the view of Hume. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CON155-66 (The Open Court Pub. Co. 1946).
Schopenhauer held the same view. See ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. DIE BEIDEN GRUNDPROBLEME DER ETHIK 177-84 (1927). See also Larmore, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
CERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

(1984);

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 154, 193 (1990); ROBERT SPAEMANN, GLOCK UND
WOHLWOLLEN: VERSUCH OBER ETHIK (1989); MICHEL VILLEY. LA FORMATION DE LA
PENStE JURIDIQUE MODERNE (1975); G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33

PHIL. 1 (1958).
15. For more details see Larmore, supra note 9; Charles Larmore, PoliticalLiberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 339-60 (1990).
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free of all contingency, on which a universal ethics can be established. It seems then that neither religion nor humanism is able to
produce a plausible ethics. This crisis of ethics is not just a secret of
the academy. It is part of the public culture. Although the foundations of the sciences are in fact in no more solid a state than those of
morality, the sciences have developed internal criteria permitting
them not only to increase their technological potential, but also to
view the status of their foundations as a purely philosophical problem. For this reason, their cultural prestige has not declined. Morality, by contrast, cannot so easily immunize itself against questions of
self-understanding.
III.
The crisis of humanist ethics might suggest that the best solution
is a return to the religious perspective. This sort of solution is in fact
as old as the awareness of the problem. Recently Daniel Bell has
made a powerful plea for just such a return.' 6 He has proclaimed
that in an age of antinomian hedonism (produced, he believes, by the
modern aesthetic) it is becoming more and more urgent to recognize
that there must be limits to the cult of self-expression. Bell, however,
identifies these limits with the sacred. "Only a God can save us,"'"
Heidegger's famous declaration from the Black Forest, might
equally be voiced by Bell on the east coast of America.
There are two objections to this nostalgia for the sacred. The first
is that in his recourse to God, Bell has oddly neglected the possibility
of simply moral limits to what he regards as contemporary sybaritism. The second is that the idea of a return to a religious ethic is
short-sighted. Bell does not ask why such an ethic was abandoned in
the first place. If the secularization of morality had been an illegitimate coup d'etat, or if it had originally been just a promising alternative to a religious ethic that seemed in difficulty, there would be
good reasons to consider returning to the point of departure. But if
secularization has instead been the inner logic of Judeo-Christian
monotheism, a return must be pointless. It would lead in the end
only to where we are already. I believe we must instead make do
with the conditions of modernity, neither hankering after lost certainties, nor rushing into the unknown of "post-modernism." I also
16. DANIEL BELL, The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of
Religion, in THE WINDING PASSAGE 324-54 (1980).
17. Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten, DER SPIEGEL, May 31, 1976, at 193 (interview of Heidegger).

believe we have the means to overcome this crisis.
The solution I propose has two parts. The first amounts to an observation about the nature of humanism. In criticizing Enlightenment ethics, I referred to a failure of humanism. But the term
"humanism" can have two different meanings. It can mean that
moral convictions must be based upon practical reason as such or (or
less plausibly, upon natural sentiment), upon a rationality that raises
us above our traditions so that we can determine the validity of our
convictions. This is the meaning of the term considered so far. But it
can also mean that we regard our moral convictions as belonging to
one or several traditions of moral thought and practice, which are
historically contingent (that is, not necessary given the nature of
practical rationality) and which we can elaborate and even change in
part, but never completely leave behind, on pain of losing our moral
bearings. In this case, the authority of morality would be indeed a
human matter, arising from this world, not from God. There would
be no return to a religious perspective. But just as importantly, it
would not be supposed that man possesses an essence, unsullied by
contingency, and sufficient to ground a morality. Man would be seen
as a Mangelwesen, whose intellectual and affective attributes are always historically conditioned, whose reason can be exercised only
within a given body of existing belief.
To the question of the legislative source of moral duties, this version of humanism could reply that it is not reason as such, either as
the capacity to construct them or as the ability to recognize their
authority. The source is our form of life, in so far as it embodies this
universal morality of categorical duties. This form of life is authoritative for our conduct if, however historically contingent it may be, it
has made us what we are, we identify with it and reason within its
terms about what we ought to do.
To grasp the nature of this form of humanism, we need to distinguish two ideas that are usually combined in the concept of a universal morality: (1) the idea that there is a set of (categorical) duties
which obligate each person with regard to all other persons as such;
and (2) the idea that this system of duties is such that each person,
simply in so far as he or she is a ratiohal being, has sufficient reason
to accept them as his or her duties. Failure to distinguish these two
ideas has been an important factor in why ethical rationalism has
seemed so appealing, and also in why antirationalists (e.g., Bernard
Williams) have been inclined to dismiss the idea of a categorical morality as a "peculiar institution."18 The more plausible version of humanism I wish to identify consists precisely in rejecting the idea of

18.
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universal justifiability (2) while keeping that of a universalist content (1). There seems no reason why we cannot affirm a set of duties
binding on all, without supposing they must be justifiable to all
(though one of these duties may well be that we should do our best
to justify to others the duties to which we hold them subject).
To do this, we must reject the familiar principle that a person can
be said to have a moral obligation only if his present beliefs are such
that he could be rationally convinced of its validity. This principle,
however, is far from evident, and often is but a corollary of the view
that practical reason is the source of morality. The applicability and
acceptability of moral demands must indeed be connected, but not
necessarily in this way. More plausible, for example, would be the
view that a moral obligation can exist only if the person subject to it
could be brought around to accept it, either by rational argument or
by some (morally permissible) form of training or socialization. The
legislative source of universal morality, so understood, will consist
then in our form of life, the moral traditions that in addition to rationality as such, foster and sustain it. (No doubt, around its edges
there exist disagreements about its content and implications; but
there is also a broad consensus about its core duties, which range
from promise-keeping to respect for bodily integrity.) This historicalsociological understanding of universal morality was introduced by
Hegel, in the theory of modern Sittlichkeit he opposed to Kant's
ethics, and later taken up by Durkheim, who made it one of the
founding ideas of modern sociology.'9
To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize, however, that in
affirming the indispensable role of moral traditions I am not falling
back on the "holism" or "communitarianism" espoused by a long
line of antiliberal thinkers since the French Revolution. There is no
question of proclaiming the fusion of society around a single substantial conception of the ultimate meaning of life. An unforsakable insight of political liberalism is that on the meaning of life reasonable
people tend naturally not to agree, but to differ and disagree. Thus
(1985); and my criticisms in LARMORE, supra note 5, at 87; Charles Larmore, Les limites de la reflexion en ethique, in 1 L'AGE DE LA SCIENCE LECTURES PHILOSOPHIQUES:
ETHIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE 199 (Francias R6conati, ed., 1988) (reviewing BERNARD
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(1985)).

19. See EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 177-209, 267-90,
391-406 (Presses universitaires de France 2d ed. 1967) (1893) (English translation: THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans. 1933)); EMILE DURKHEIM,
L'EDUCATION MORALE 1-12 (Presses universitaires de France 1963) (1925); TALCOTT

PARSONS. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES 182-214 (Jackson Toby ed., 1977).

arises the liberal effort to focus on a universal morality, necessarily
minimal, that can be shared as broadly as possible despite these disagreements. 20 Sadly, a number of thinkers who have seen the connection between moral rationality and tradition have thought this an
indictment of liberalism, forgetting that the liberal project has itself
become a central part of our form of life. It is of this universal morality that my idea of moral tradition is meant to provide a satisfactory account. What recommends this account is the second part of
the solution I am proposing, an epistemology that moves beyond the
usual dichotomy between reason and historical contingency. It shows
why, despite appearances, this account of the authority of a categorical morality is not inadequate, why it is not a sort of ethnocentric
relativism.
IV.
I have already observed that it is quite possible to justify the validity of certain moral obligations, if instead of ascending to an absolutely detached point of view, we rely upon the presumed validity of
other moral obligations. The epistemology I shall present is one that
makes this contextual form of justification appear no longer deficient, but normal. It also has a general applicability, as suitable for
the sciences as for ethics. In essence, it builds on some ideas of
American pragmatism. But since in recent years the term "pragmatism" has been appropriated (by Richard Rorty) for ends which are
not mine, I shall not make much of this historical connection.
The epistemology turns on a rather obvious fact as well as on two
cognitive norms that are as important as they have been neglected.
The fact is that we are always in possession of a great many beliefs.
To this fact are added the following principles: (1) We need a good
reason to open our mind just as we need one to make up our mind.
More precisely, just as to adopt a belief we do not yet hold we must
have positive, specific reasons to believe it is true, so to put in doubt
a belief we already hold we must have good reasons to believe it is
doubtful, that is, that it may be false. (Doubting a proposition
means, of course, believing neither it nor its opposite, but suspending
judgment.) (2) To justify a proposition is not simply to give some
true premises from which the proposition follows, but instead to give
reasons that dispel a doubt to the effect that the proposition may be
false. The first principle rests on a demand for symmetry in the conditions under which we may rightly come or cease to believe. The
second assumes that justification is a problem-solving activity, and in
20. Actually, only that part of such a universal morality which can be legitimately
enforced belongs to the normative principles of political liberalism. For details see
Larmore, supra note 9.
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particular one geared to the twin problems of acquiring truths and
avoiding falsehood. Together these two principles have the important
consequence that we need to justify a belief we already have only if
we have first found reasons to believe it is doubtful.
It is this consequence that brings out the novelty of the two norms.
It is usually assumed that reason requires that each of our beliefs be
justified. (Often the assumption takes the form of the requirement
that beliefs serving to justify other beliefs must themselves be justified.) This assumption has become so routine and unthinking, that its
original motives have come to be forgotten. Such a requirement has
arisen, in fact, not so much from reason as from the metaphysical
aspiration to view the world sub specie aeternitatis, an aspiration
animating most of Enlightenment thought as well. The demand that
each of our beliefs be justified is the demand that we undo the
weight of historical circumstance and rethink our commitments on
the basis of reason alone. This conception of when belief must be
justified grows out of a very different purpose than the view that
justification is a response to doubt (or at least this is so, as long as
the world of becoming is not taken to be the world of illusion). The
decisive question is thus whether we want epistemology to be a guide
to eternity or a code for problem-solving. If we give up that metaphysical aspiration, and take as our rule that we must have positive
reasons for thinking some belief of ours may be false if we are to put
the belief in doubt and so demand its justification, the idea that our
beliefs must be justified will fall away. The mere fact that we already have a belief, and that we have it because of our historical
context, is not a good reason to think it may be false and so not a
good reason to demand that it be justified. Moreover, if we indeed
find positive reasons for putting a belief of ours in doubt, we must
continue to rely on our other existing beliefs, not only to find a solution to this doubt, but also, even before that, to discover the positive
reasons that give rise to our doubt. There is in this view, therefore,
no opposition between historical rootedness and rationality.
Clearly this epistemology needs more elaboration. I want here to
make only one further remark about it, to ward off misunderstanding. The conception of justification at issue is obviously not what is
called "foundationalist."But neither is it "coherentist," as this common alternative is usually conceived. 2 ' Both these views of justification share the assumption that all our beliefs are to be justified. They
21.

A good example of the common use of this dichotomy is the excellent book by
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differ only in whether this is to be in terms of their relation to some
foundational set of beliefs, or in terms of the "coherence" relations
among our beliefs. Just this shared assumption is what I believe
must be rejected. The contextualist view of justification I am proposing might best be described as claiming, not that our beliefs, but
that changes in our beliefs are the proper object of justification. In
deciding whether to adopt a new belief, for example, we are to ask,
not whether the set of our existing beliefs plus the new one is justified by its coherence, but whether the new belief is justified by what
we already believe. (Note that the coherentist must be in some difficulty about the status of his criteria of coherence, since they surely
figure among his existing beliefs. Are they supposed to be at once
part of what is justified and what serves to justify?)
Now the implication of this contextualist view is that our existing
moral convictions do not as such call for justification. If we already
believe in a set of universalist duties, they are authoritative for our
conduct. Where we find reason to change some of these convictions
or to elaborate them further, it will be on the basis of others of these
convictions (along with non-moral information) that remain fixed.
And if we ask for the source of these moral laws, it will be the form
of life that sustains them. Here is the conception of morality we were
seeking, in which reason and historical contingency no longer stand
opposed.
It would be a mistake to object that I am begging the question
about the authority of this universal morality. I am not arguing that
its authority is justified because we have an allegiance to this morality. I am urging, instead, that if we have this allegiance, the question
of justification does not arise. It does not do so, until we come upon a
good reason to doubt whether such a morality is correct. And here I
should note that according to this epistemology a good reason for
doubting an existing belief is not the mere fact that someone else (in
this case, a Nietzschean, for example) may have reasons to reject it.
A good reason for us to doubt, and so to raise the question of justification, must be one that is good by our own lights, for it must be
supported by our other beliefs. (Of course, even if we have no reason
to ask whether we are justified in holding some moral belief, we may
still be obliged, as I indicated before, to do our best to justify it to
others who do not share it.) Once we see that the universal morality
we recognize can be detached from Enlightenment rationalism, have
we any reason to doubt its validity?
(Though convinced of the correctness of this moral epistemology, I
also DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 101, 123

(1989). The contextualist view of justification I propose is in many ways akin to what
Rawls has called the method of "reflective equilibrium," though many discussions of this
method do not distinguish clearly between contextualism and coherentism.
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want to admit to a nagging worry: Even if the metaphysical aspiration to eternity is to have no role in a proper epistemology, could it
still have been a necessary element in the historical formation of
those universalist moral traditions which are ours today? Could one
have gotten to where we are now, only if one had not reasoned as I
am urging we now should do, only if instead one had imagined this
morality was the voice of Reason itself? An affirmative answer
would not refute the epistemological principles I have defended, nor
discredit our inherited moral beliefs. But it would make one wonder
whether being reasonable must always be the most important thing
in the world.)
This epistemology does not resolve all problems of justification in
the domain of morality. Many vital questions will remain as difficult
as before. Much depends on the nature of the moral traditions we
can still affirm, after several centuries of legitimate criticism, but
also of reckless attack. But if we can still recognize in our form of
life a commitment to a universal ethic of categorical duties, we may
consider this form of life as the source of authority for these moral
convictions. By reasoning within this form of life, we are not doing
less than reason demands. In reality, no doubt, a great deal of moral
argument already proceeds along these lines. What needs to be
changed is our self-understanding. In this way we can avoid the chief
failure of Enlightenment ethics, yet continue to affirm the moral outlook of modernity. We can rely upon a conception of reason that is
equal to our unprecedented intellectual situation - a situation that
is beyond religion and Enlightenment.

